Beyond Retaliation: Rethinking Deterrence Against Asymmetric Nuclear Threats

The article "Escaping Paralysis: Strategies for Countering Asymmetric Nuclear Coercion" by Even Hellan Larsen (Feb. 22, 2024) explores methods to counter threats from adversaries with smaller nuclear arsenals who may attempt to leverage their capabilities for coercive purposes. The study critiques the traditional countervalue punishment strategy, which aims to deter adversaries by threatening significant retaliation against valuable targets. The authors argue that this approach may be insufficient, as adversaries might believe they can manage escalation to their advantage. Instead, the article suggests alternative strategies that focus on convincing adversaries of the impossibility of controlling escalation, thereby strengthening deterrence and reducing the likelihood of nuclear coercion. Link to Article

Discussion Questions:

1. In what ways might traditional countervalue punishment strategies be inadequate in deterring adversaries with smaller nuclear arsenals?

2. How can alternative deterrence strategies be developed to persuade adversaries that escalation cannot be managed to their benefit?

3. How does an adversary's belief in their ability to control escalation affect their strategic decisions in nuclear coercion scenarios?

4. What are the potential risks and ethical considerations involved in implementing strategies that aim to convince adversaries of the uncontrollability of escalation?

Key Terms and Concepts:

Asymmetric Nuclear Coercion: A situation where a state with a smaller or less advanced nuclear arsenal attempts to influence the behavior of a more powerful adversary by leveraging its nuclear capabilities.

Countervalue Punishment Strategy: A deterrence approach that involves threatening to destroy an adversary's valuable assets, such as cities or economic centers, to dissuade them from taking aggressive actions.

Escalation: The process by which conflicts grow in severity or scale over time, potentially leading to broader or more intense hostilities.

Escalation Control: The belief that a state can manage the intensity and scope of a conflict, preventing it from spiraling into uncontrolled warfare.

The article emphasizes that traditional deterrence strategies may not be effective against adversaries who believe they can control escalation. Therefore, it advocates for developing approaches that convince such adversaries that any attempt at nuclear coercion will lead to uncontrollable and unacceptable consequences, thereby enhancing overall strategic stability.